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Abstract
Canada has announced plans to meet its Paris Agreement commitments on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and achieving net-zero by 2035; but standing in the way of these ambitions is an electricity
crisis. The crisis is provincially balkanized electricity systems with a dearth of interprovincial transmission
lines, and the impacts are three-fold. First, the country is divided into renewable have- and have-not
provinces, with some jurisdictions generating more hydropower than they need while others struggle to
wean themselves off coal and natural gas. Second, the lack of interprovincial transmission is a deterrent
to private investment in renewable energy projects, which is holding Canada back from meeting its
climate commitments in a way that could provide major economic gains. Third, much of the country is
off-grid, relying on expensive, unreliable, and dangerous diesel fuel for power. An initial step towards
addressing these issues would be to create a new market for interprovincial zero-emission power sales by
exercising federal jurisdiction over the permitting of interprovincial transmission lines in order to
encourage private companies to enter the market and remove some of the financial burden from
provinces. Given the national and provincial goals of reducing power from coal-fired power plants and the
urgency of energy access issues in many parts of the country, it is time for the federal government to
assume at least some of its infrastructure transmission jurisdiction to ensure just transition to safe,
renewable power sources, and to promote investment in renewable projects across the country. To that
end, this article will lay out the constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction over interprovincial power lines,
as well as the constitutional limits on that jurisdiction that will keep provincial grids under provincial
control.

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol59/iss3/3

629

Lost in Transmission: A Constitutional
Approach to Achieving a Nationwide Net
Zero Electricity System
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Canada has announced plans to meet its Paris Agreement commitments on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net-zero by 2035; but standing in the way of these
ambitions is an electricity crisis. The crisis is provincially balkanized electricity systems
with a dearth of interprovincial transmission lines, and the impacts are three-fold. First,
the country is divided into renewable have- and have-not provinces, with some jurisdictions
generating more hydropower than they need while others struggle to wean themselves off
coal and natural gas. Second, the lack of interprovincial transmission is a deterrent to private
investment in renewable energy projects, which is holding Canada back from meeting its
climate commitments in a way that could provide major economic gains. Third, much of the
country is off-grid, relying on expensive, unreliable, and dangerous diesel fuel for power.
An initial step towards addressing these issues would be to create a new market for
interprovincial zero-emission power sales by exercising federal jurisdiction over the
permitting of interprovincial transmission lines in order to encourage private companies to
enter the market and remove some of the financial burden from provinces. Given the national
and provincial goals of reducing power from coal-fired power plants and the urgency of
energy access issues in many parts of the country, it is time for the federal government to
assume at least some of its infrastructure transmission jurisdiction to ensure just transition
to safe, renewable power sources, and to promote investment in renewable projects across
the country. To that end, this article will lay out the constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction
over interprovincial power lines, as well as the constitutional limits on that jurisdiction that
will keep provincial grids under provincial control.
*
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WHILE “[I]T’S KIND OF A UNIVERSAL CONCLUSION that larger grids are better,”1

Canada does not have a national electric grid, and there are currently no plans
to change this.2 Instead, the country has a provincial patchwork of transmission
lines that run south to north—though often, not very far north—and stop
sharply at east-west provincial borders, leaving several provinces dependent on
fossil fuels while their neighbours sell excess hydropower to the United States, and
leaving large swaths of the country without access to safe and reliable electricity
while preventing robust sales of power between provinces. Adding more national
transmission infrastructure would provide a much-needed boost to the country’s
economy, allow provinces that are currently dependent on hydrocarbons to
integrate more renewable resources, and promote growth and self-sufciency
for rural and Indigenous communities. Indeed, the addition of signifcant
interprovincial transmission capacity could allow Canada to be the frst country
in the world to have 100 per cent renewable electricity generation within a matter
of decades. Tis is an urgent need, as the country has pledged to decarbonize its
electricity sector and achieve net-zero by 2035 while certain provinces are still

1.
2.

Daniel Oberhaus, “Te Real Challenge for a Green New Deal Isn’t Politics,” Wired (9
July 2019), online: <www.wired.com/story/real-challenge-green-new-deal-isnt-politics>
[perma.cc/646N-WVR7].
See Ian Blue, “Of the Grid: Federal Jurisdiction and the Canadian Electricity Sector” (2009)
32 Dal LJ 339 at 340-42.
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dependent on coal and natural gas for the bulk of their electricity generation.3
So, unless the electricity status quo changes—and soon—none of these things
are likely to happen.4
Transmission lines carry electricity generated at large power plants to
communities, where the voltage of the power is lowered in step-down transformers
and then sent into distribution lines that connect to homes, businesses, and
industrial facilities.5 Collectively, transmission lines in a particular geographic
area are known as “the grid.” When a new power plant is built, it must be
connected to the grid by a dedicated transmission line that allows power to be
sent into existing infrastructure.6 Additionally, if there are no nearby transmission
lines, new infrastructure will need to be built in order to connect the power
plant to the grid. Tis is often the case with wind and solar facilities because
they are built in rural areas where the resources are plentiful and there is room to
accommodate their space requirements.7 Similarly, remote communities are often
not connected to the grid because the transmission lines are expensive to build,
and some utility companies do not want to incur such an expense to connect a
small number of ratepayers.
Tis article describes a major governance gap—specifcally, the refusal of
the federal government to exercise its jurisdiction over interprovincial electricity
transmission—and suggests a novel solution: federal and provincial cooperation,
with the federal government permitting interprovincial lines while provinces
continue to oversee their existing grids. It argues that, as a normative proposition,
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

See Government of Canada, “A Clean Electricity Standard in Support of a Net-Zero Electricity
Sector: Discussion Paper” (last modifed 16 March 2022), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/
achieving-net-zero-emissions-electricity-generation-discussion-paper.html>
[perma.cc/589V-DF2N].
Tere are additional reasons to increase the number of interprovincial electricity connections,
including grid modernization, strengthening grid reliability and load balancing, and
increased export opportunities to the United States, but this article focuses on the energy
justice and climate change aspects in particular. See ibid.
See PJM, “Transmission & Distribution” (n.d.), online: PJM Learning Center <learn.pjm.
com/electricity-basics/transmission-distribution> [perma.cc/3VUR-GUU9].
Ibid. In competitive wholesale power markets, these lines are sometimes called “merchant
lines.” See Alberta Electric Systems Operator, “Glossary of Terms: Merchant Transmission”
(2016), online: <www.aeso.ca/aeso/glossary-of-terms> [perma.cc/H9DM-SFVZ].
See American Wind Energy Association, “Economic Development” (n.d.), online:
<www.awea.org/wind-101/benefts-of-wind/economic-development> [perma.
cc/5B6V-MU2R?type=image]; Wind Energy Technologies Ofce, “Wind Resource
Assessment and Characterization” (n.d.), online: US Department of Energy <www.energy.gov/
eere/wind/wind-resource-assessment-and-characterization> [perma.cc/QU2B-MPHV].

632

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

the federal government can and should assume jurisdiction over interprovincial
transmission lines. Tis article thus examines the legal framework of electricity
infrastructure in Canada and, particularly, the potential reasons for the lack
of involvement in interprovincial projects by the federal government. It then
argues that the lack of interprovincial transmission is a national problem since
it strangles the economic prospects of of-grid communities, creates regulatory
hurdles that discourage private investment that makes the country a laggard in
new renewable energy technologies (particularly wind and solar), and frustrates
further decarbonization. Finally, the article lays out the constitutional basis for
federal jurisdiction over interprovincial transmission lines and posits that the
decision not to exercise this jurisdiction is a policy choice, not a legal one, and
must be revisited.
Part I gives an overview of the current state of provincial grids and proposes
possible reasons for federal abdication in the area. Part II makes the climate
change case for adding more interprovincial electricity infrastructure. Part III
addresses the potential economic advantages to investing in interprovincial
power now, including possible implications of more renewable power build-out
to meet new interprovincial demand. Part IV addresses the impacts of energy
poverty on of-grid communities, particularly on reserve and claimed land,
and explores the economic impacts of having virtually no east-to-west electric
grid, particularly for fossil-fuel-dependent provinces and territories and rural
areas close to provincial borders. Lastly, Part V makes the constitutional case for
parallel federal and provincial jurisdiction for interprovincial and interprovincial
transmission, respectively.

I. THE HISTORY OF CANADA’S LACK OF INTERPROVINCIAL
TRANSMISSION LINES
Tere are two things to understand about jurisdiction over interprovincial
transmission lines: First, as discussed more fully below, the federal government
almost certainly has exclusive jurisdiction over them. Second, the federal
government has never exercised that jurisdiction, which leads to the question of
why this is so. Te federal government’s decision not to exercise this jurisdiction is
perplexing, since similar projects—oil and pipelines being the prime example—
are unquestionably and exclusively overseen by federal regulators.8 To understand
8.

For a fnding that federal jurisdiction over an interprovincial pipeline was exclusive, see
Reference re Environmental Management Act, 2019 BCCA 181 [RREMA, BCCA], af’d 2020
SCC 1 [RREMA, SCC].
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why interprovincial transmission lines are apparently considered of-limits by the
federal government, and to put this position into context by considering past
reasons for federal abstention in this area, it is useful to look at the history of
electricity utility development in Canada, as well as to consider the political forces
that have thus far kept provinces in total control of their electricity resources,
infrastructure, and commerce.
A. ELECTRICITY IN CANADA: A STORY OF PROVINCIAL OWNERSHIP AND
PROTECTIONISM

Te electricity sector can be divided into four segments: generation, transmission,
distribution, and retail sales.9 Generation is the creation of electricity, generally by
generating sufcient heat to boil water and create steam, which then spins turbines
to generate power, a process that can be propelled by many diferent resources,
from solar energy to coal.10 Transmission lines send the generated electricity at
high voltages over long distances to substations, where voltage can be lowered to
accommodate distribution lines—the lines we see in neighbourhoods all over the
world. Finally, retail is the sale of electricity to consumers, usually through rate
formulas set by regulators. Electric utilities (which often are also gas utilities) can
be investor-owned, municipally-owned, or provincially or state-owned. Tey can
also be vertically integrated—i.e., the same entity owns or controls all four stages
of electricity delivery—or they can be unbundled. —i.e., a legal requirement in
some jurisdictions breaks up the monopolies of vertically integrated utilities by
forcing them to sell their generation, transmission, and sometimes distribution
and retail assets.11 Unbundling refers to the economic separation of the four

9.

US Energy Information Administration, “Electricity Explained: How Electricity is Delivered
to Customers” (3 November 2021), online: <www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/
delivery-to-consumers.php> [perma.cc/UU6V-ZRVV].
10. An exception to this is solar photovoltaic panels—the same kinds of panels commonly
installed on residential roofs, which use a superconducting material to create an
electrical charge. See Andrew Blakers, “Explainer: What is Photovoltaic Solar Energy?,”
Te Conversation (25 March 2013), online: <theconversation.com/explainer-what-isphotovoltaic-solar-energy-12924> [perma.cc/24T4-J4GR].
11. See David Roberts, “Power Utilities are Built for the 20th Century. Tat’s Why they’re
Flailing in the 21st,” Vox (9 September 2015), online: <www.vox.com/2015/9/9/9287719/
utilities-monopoly> [perma.cc/D8X2-9LEM].
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sectors into economically distinct markets, despite their physical connection.12
Alberta is the only jurisdiction in Canada with a fully unbundled and deregulated
electricity sector, with competitive markets for both generation and retail sales.13
In both Canada and the United States, each type of the above-described
utilities exists, but the mix is vastly diferent between the two countries. In the
United States, most utilities are investor-owned and unbundled, following a
series of orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the
mid-1990s and early 2000s intended to increase competition in the generation
and retail sectors and, by extension, lower electricity rates.14 Tere are places in the
United States, especially in the southeast and the mountain west, where vertically
integrated investor-owned utilities remain the norm, but the rest of the country
has moved to an unbundled, competitive wholesale (meaning generation side)
electricity market, with access to transmission lines guaranteed under publicly
available rates (these are called “open access transmission tarifs,” or OATTs).15
Because of OATTs, any company wanting to build a power plant, whether the
facility is solar, wind, nuclear, coal, or any other resource, knows what it will
cost to connect to the closest transmission lines, and thus to the grid.16 Tis also

12. See Hung Po Chao, Shmuel Oren & Robert Wilson, “Reevaluation of Vertical Integration
and Unbundling in Restructured Electricity Markets” in Fereidoon P Sioshansi, eds,
Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance (Elsevier, 2008)
27; Sharon B Jacobs, “Te Administrative State’s Passive Virtues” (2014) 66 Admin L
Rev 566 at 566-67.
13. See Rebecca T Richards, “Regional Rural Development and Energy Reform: Te Case of
Electric Deregulation in Montana and Alberta” (2007) 20 Society & Natural Resources
647 at 652; Natural Resources Canada, “About Electricity” (last modifed 15 June
2020), online: <www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sources-distribution/
electricity-infrastructure/about-electricity/7359> [perma.cc/93UW-66NT].
14. See Joel B Eisen, “FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid” (2016) 49
UC Davis L Rev 1783 at 1792-93. Also note that the transmission and distribution sectors
in both the United States and Canada are generally still owned by utilities with geographic
monopolies. Tere are several reasons for this, but the simplest explanation is that these
systems are “natural” monopolies—the services they provide are at their lowest cost to
consumers when there is only one provider.
15. See ibid at 1815-16. Also note that Canadian utilities that sell power to the United States—
which is almost all of them—must also abide by FERC’s OATT requirements, meaning that
they cannot charge diferent rates from diferent companies that want to connect to their
transmission lines, even within the country. See Blue, supra note 2 at 344-45. Tis also means
that the federal government has a template for setting transmission tarifs for interprovincial
connections since most Canadian transmission owners already comply with FERC orders
on the subject.
16. See Eisen, supra note 14 at 1815-16.
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prevents transmission line owners from cherry-picking which generators to allow
access to the grid by engaging in price discrimination.17
FERC was able to issue the relevant orders to achieve both unbundling
of the electricity sector nationwide and the establishment of publicly available
OATTs because the United States federal government has jurisdiction over all
transmission lines, even if they are located solely within one state.18 Tis was
established by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v.
Florida Power & Light, in which the US Court held that a transmission line in
Florida that connected to transmission lines in Georgia for reliability purposes
was sufcient to establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the
US Constitution.19 Te fact that the line in question did not actually facilitate
the sale of power between the states was irrelevant because there was no way
to tell whether the electricity in the line at any given time was generated in
Florida or Georgia.20
Te result is that US states do not have regulatory oversight over transmission
lines, even ones solely within their borders, and cannot technically stop their
permitting. However, they do retain the authority to approve the siting of the line
within their borders.21 Tere have been some attempts to give FERC more siting
authority since state resistance can (and does) derail projects, but these eforts have
so far failed.22 Still, the United States is connected by a truly national network
17. See Gert Brunkreeft, “Network Unbundling and Flawed Coordination: Experience from the
Electricity Sector” (2015) 34 Utilities Policy 11 at 13. Note also that because many provinces
connect to US-based utilities, they must abide by FERC’s OATT requirement as well. See
e.g. Manitoba Hydro, “Tarifs” (n.d.), online: <www.hydro.mb.ca/accounts_and_services/
generating_your_own_electricity/tarifs> [perma.cc/M2TR-8NKE].
18. See Ari Peskoe, “Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale
Electricity Markets” (2017) 38 Energy LJ 1 at 3.
19. Federal Power Commission v Florida Power & Light Co, 404 US 453 at 457,
460-62, 469-75 (1972).
20. See ibid at 461 (explaining that all power entering a “bus” is commingled).
21. See Peskoe, supra note 18.
22. Under the Environmental Protection Act, 1990, Congress gave FERC backstop siting
jurisdiction when state utility commissions withheld permission for proposals and the
proposed line fell within a federally designated national energy corridor. See Debbie
Swanstrom & Meredith M Jolivert, “DOE Transmission Corridor Designations & FERC
Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating
the Development of New Transmission Facilities?” (2009) 30 Energy LJ 415 at 418-421.
However, states quickly learned that if they did not rule on a line one way or another, this
did not count as a refusal and thus did not trigger FERC’s jurisdiction. See Brian R Gish, “Is
FERC Backstop Siting Authority Still Alive?,” Power Magazine (1 May 2011), online: <www.
powermag.com/is-ferc-backstop-siting-authority-still-alive> [perma.cc/4V8G-NEUW].
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of transmission lines, and although more lines would be needed to completely
decarbonize the American grid, the fact that (as an example) a transmission line
connects a solar facility in Arizona to customers in California is not considered
noteworthy or politically troublesome in and of itself.23 Te only exception to
this sweeping federal jurisdiction over the US transmission system is Texas, which
refuses to connect its main grid to any out-of-state systems specifcally to avoid
FERC’s authority.24
In Canada, most provinces receive the bulk of their electricity from vertically
integrated Crown Corporations, owned by provinces as sole shareholders
and controlled by provincial legislatures.25 Tese utilities include BC Hydro,
Manitoba Hydro, Hydro-Québec, SaskPower, Hydro One,26 and others. Tis
model is so prevalent in the country that only two provinces do not have a Crown
Corporation providing most of their electricity services: Alberta and Nova Scotia
(and, to an extent, Ontario). And, of those two provinces, Alberta comes closest
to the prevailing US model, with a competitive generation market dominated
by investor-owned, unbundled companies that compete through a bidding
process managed by the Alberta Utilities Commission and the Alberta Electric
System Operator.27 It also has a competitive retail market regulated by the Alberta
Utilities Commission.28 Even in provinces that have provincial utilities, there are

23. Tis is not to say transmission projects are not controversial, but occasionally they are
controversial because they do not confer any benefts on residents of the states where they
are located. See James Coleman, “Pipelines and Powerlines: Building the Energy Transport
Future” (2019) 80 Ohio St LJ 263 at 283 (noting resistance by some Arkansas landowners
to federal permitting of a transmission line intended to deliver renewable power to another
state, but also noting that the legal challenge to the federal permit was later abandoned).
24. See Kate Galbraith, “Why Does Texas Have Its Own Power Grid?” (16 February
2021), online: Houston Public Media <www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/
energy-environment/2021/02/15/391519/why-does-texas-have-its-own-power-grid>
[perma.cc/A5N6-VGY2].
25. See Blue, supra note 2 at 340-41.
26. Ontario has sold its majority stake in Hydro One, although it does still retain some
ownership. See Mike Crawley, “How Privatized Power Haunts Ontario Politics,” CBC
News (9 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-hydro-billsprivatization-1.4439500> [perma.cc/D4DU-K472].
27. See Alberta Electric System Operator, “Guide to Understanding Alberta’s Electricity Market”
(2016), online: <www.aeso.ca/aeso/training/guide-to-understanding-albertas-electricitymarket> [perma.cc/B9M2-S4ER].
28. Alberta Utilities Commission, “Who We Regulate” (n.d.), online: <www.auc.ab.ca/pages/
who-we-regulate.aspx> [perma.cc/FC62-8S4A].
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still private and municipal utilities, primarily on the generation side.29 However,
the provincial utilities own most of the transmission lines within their respective
provinces and use retail rates as the primary source of fnancing for their current
operations and future projects.30
Tis economic reality gets to the heart of why there are so few interprovincial
transmission lines: In order to pay for the lines, which can cost hundreds of
millions of dollars, a provincially-owned utility would have to pass on the costs
to its existing customers while not being able to reach new customers (which
it cannot do in another province), although this could be somewhat allayed by
selling the power to another province under contract.31 Selling under power
contract is, in fact, the model currently used to pay for the few interprovincial
lines that are currently in place for commercial reasons, with one example being
Hydro-Québec selling power to Ontario for negotiated prices.32 Absent such
an agreement, one can imagine that customers in, say, Manitoba would be less
than thrilled about paying higher electricity bills to fnance a project that sends
clean power to a Saskatchewan transmission line at the border, as it would be
29. In British Columbia, for example, BC Hydro buys additional generation from BC- and
US-based private companies via its wholly-owned subsidiary Powerex. See Sarah Cox, “Clean
B.C. is Quietly Using Coal and Gas Power from Out of Province. Here’s Why,” Te Narwhal
(3 December 2019), online: <thenarwhal.ca/clean-b-c-is-quietly-using-coal-and-gas-powerfrom-out-of-province-heres-why> [perma.cc/7LYN-YGYV] [Cox, “Clean BC”].
30. See Blue, supra note 2 at 341.
31. Tis is what is done with international power lines. See e.g. Hydro-Québec,
Press Release, “Energy Supply Contracts Get Green Light from Massachusetts”
(26 June 2019), online: <news.hydroquebec.com/en/press-releases/1516/
energy-supply-contracts-get-green-light-from-massachusetts-another-important-milestonefor-hydro-quebec-and-lower-carbon-emissions-for-new-england> [perma.cc/B94W-HEBH].
With respect to interprovincial lines, one ofcial from Manitoba Hydro put the economic
calculus plainly:
Te single biggest challenge between Manitoba and Saskatchewan is funding. Manitoba’s
electric sector is already 100% renewable. We already have a very large and adequate
interconnected capability into the United States. For us to invest half a billion dollars or a
billion dollars in more transmission lines to connect to Saskatchewan doesn’t bring the
province any more value than we already have. To the extent that the federal government is
able to fund the Manitoba portion of that transmission line, it would make it a much more
viable project for Saskatchewan.

See Canada, House of Commons, Strategic Energy Interties: Report of the Standing Committee
on Natural Resources, 42-1, No 7 (December 2017) at 15 (Chair: James Maloney).
32. See Hydro-Québec, “Exchanges with Ontario” (n.d.), online: <www.hydroquebec.
com/clean-energy-provider/markets/ontario.html> [perma.cc/5BP5-79TV]
[Hydro-Québec, “Exchanges”].

638

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

SaskPower collecting rates for the power being generated in Manitoba but sold
in Saskatchewan.
Te problem is not only economic. Because most Canadian utilities are
provincially owned, interprovincial power projects can be politically charged.33
In the above example, it is not much of a leap to go from saying Manitoba Hydro
wants to sell power to SaskPower, to saying Manitoba wants to sell power to
Saskatchewan. By contrast, if Manitoba sells power to an investor-owned utility
in North Dakota, the same political dynamics are not there. Tis transaction
can be pitched to Manitoba voters and ratepayers as proftable without running
the risk that North Dakota might ask to build transmission lines in Manitoba
in return and without implicating any existing tensions between Manitoba and
North Dakota (because, again, the purchasing utility is only located in the state,
it is not owned by the state).34 As a result, provinces like Manitoba that produce
more renewable energy than they need are selling it to investor-owned US
utilities instead of to other provinces, which leaves provinces that are dependent

33. In its submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Natural Resources, the
Canada West Foundation observed that the idea of more interprovincial transmission lines
has been foated many times in Western Canada, but often gains little traction for
reasons...related to provincial fears of losing infuence over their own electricity grids. At times
it was rejected because some provinces feared cheap coal power from Alberta would food into
their markets and harm their own utilities. At other times, Alberta rejected the idea because of
fears cheap hydro could put their coal power plants out of business.

See Nick Martin, “Strategic Electricity Inter-ties: Submission to the House of Commons’
Standing Committee on Natural Resources,” Canada West Foundation (2 October 2017),
online: <cwf.ca/research/publications/submission-to-the-house-of-commons-standingcommittee-on-natural-resources> [perma.cc/BH95-C4JZ].
34. North Dakota (like most US states) does not have a state-owned electric utility. See North
Dakota Public Service Commission, “Information by Jurisdiction: Electric and Gas
Information” (2015), online: Ofcial Portal for North Dakota State Government <www.psc.
nd.gov/public/consinfo/jurisdictionelectricgas.php> [perma.cc/VT8K-YR4P]. Interestingly,
Alberta also does not have a provincially owned utility, but investor-owned utilities and
generators in Alberta may be thought of as an extension of the Alberta government
regardless, not because they are in fact, but because not thinking of electricity this way
may be foreign in other provinces. See Alberta Electric System Operator, “Guide to
Understanding Alberta’s Electricity Market: Evolution of Alberta’s Electricity Market” (n.d.),
online: <www.aeso.ca/aeso/continuing-education/guide-to-understanding-albertas-electricitymarket> [perma.cc/WR9Y-6WPT] (“Unlike most provinces in Canada, the Alberta
government has never owned and operated a utility company”).
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on hydrocarbons—like Saskatchewan—to fnd their own ways to decarbonize.35
Meanwhile, rural and Indigenous communities remain of-grid and must either
use diesel generators or join a rural electricity cooperative, if one exists in the area.
Adding more interprovincial transmission lines would be a step towards
increasing the interprovincial trade in renewable power, which could be used to
connect the existing system to privately-owned wind, solar, and other non-hydro
renewable power plants. Provincially-owned utilities are often reluctant to
build wind and solar facilities themselves, so connecting with these facilities in
neighbouring provinces would provide an alternative solution, as well as allow
fossil-fuel dependent provinces to connect with their hydro-rich neighbours.
Tese kinds of interprovincial connections could thus help to phase out coal
and natural gas-burning power plants more rapidly, which in turn could push
the electricity sector to 100 per cent renewables much more quickly than will
happen if we rely on the provinces to do it alone. To do this, federal jurisdiction
over interprovincial connections could fast-track these projects and help to avoid
the conficts between provinces that are blocking them altogether. And there is
a compelling legal case that interprovincial transmission lines would be within
federal jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867.36 Indeed, the Canada
Energy Regulator (CER) already reviews permit applications for international
transmission lines, and the possibility of regulating interprovincial lines is
explicitly included in the CER’s regulatory mandate.37 So why has the federal
government never assumed this authority?
B. THE LEGACY OF CHURCHILL FALLS: FEDERAL ABDICATION IN THE
ELECTRICITY SECTOR

Te Churchill Falls hydroelectric project was originally conceived as a path
towards economic prosperity for the then-British colony of Newfoundland. After
Newfoundland was admitted to the confederation along with Labrador, it was
believed by proponents that Churchill Falls would ofer a much-needed source
of revenue to the new province by selling the bulk of the generated electricity
to the United States, specifcally the Boston area. After all, Newfoundland and
35. Alberta, for example, is on track to fail in meeting its renewable electricity target of 30%
by 2030. See Nigel Bankes, “Community Generation Projects in Alberta,” Ablawg.ca (30
June 2020) at 6, online (blog): University of Calgary Faculty of Law <ablawg.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/Blog_NB_CommunityGenerationProjects.pdf> [perma.cc/J9YM-RELU]
(“Te demise of the renewable energy program (REP) put in place by the Notley government
pretty much guarantees that Alberta will not reach its renewable target of 30% by 2030”).
36. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5 [CA, 1867].
37. Canadian Energy Regulator Act, SC 2019, c 28, ss 10, 11(b) [CER Act].
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Labrador’s small population could not consume all of the power produced by
Churchill Falls, so the surplus was a valuable commodity.38 However, rocky
relations with Québec posed a problem from the beginning.39
Te only way for Newfoundland to deliver electricity generated by the
proposed dam to utilities in the United States was through transmission lines that
would have to cross through Québec, and Québec was not amenable to this (a
longer route through the Maritimes would have been so expensive to build that no
profts from the sale of electricity would be realized).40 Even after Newfoundland
and Labrador joined the confederation, Québec’s resistance to allowing
transmission lines to cross through its territory remained, possibly fueled by
continuing resentment over the loss of Labrador—which Québec had previously
claimed—to the newer province.41 For the same reason, the then-premier of
Newfoundland, Joey Smallwood, refused to consider nationalizing the project
because he did not want Québec to have any avenue toward building facilities on
formerly disputed parts of Labrador, thus illustrating the deep distrust between
both provinces.42 Despite the fact that Churchill Falls was seen as the lynchpin to
Newfoundland’s economic prosperity, Québec’s aggressive stance did not put the
newer province in a bargaining mood.
Te result of this political gamesmanship was a stalemate that lasted for
decades. At times, the federal government seemed supportive of playing a role
in the dispute, but there was much reluctance at other times (and during other
administrations). However, Ottawa was not entirely absent from electricity issues.
In 1961, the federal government negotiated the Columbia River Treaty with
the United States, giving British Columbia a signifcant role in the cooperative
management of the Columbia River, including its use as a source of hydroelectric
power on the Canadian side of the border.43 In 1965, the federal government
agreed to help Manitoba to fnance the construction of the Nelson Dam and the
transmission lines needed to deliver its power.44 Te explanation for why Ottawa
was willing to play a direct role in these projects and not in the dispute over
38. See Jason L Churchill, “Pragmatic Federalism: Te Politics Behind the 1969 Churchill Falls
Contract” (1999) 15 Newfoundland Stud 215 at 216.
39. Ibid at 216-17.
40. See ibid at 217, 228.
41. See ibid at 217-18.
42. Ibid at 227.
43. See Nigel Bankes & Barbara Cosens, “Te Future of the Columbia River Treaty” (Program
on Water Issues submitted to the Munk School of Global Afairs at the University of
Toronto, 11 June 2012).
44. See Churchill, supra note 38 at 230.
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Churchill Falls seemed to be that the latter involved two provinces—that were
not getting along—as opposed to just one.45
In 1966, Premier Smallwood was ready to present a letter to Parliament
asking for the Churchill Falls project to be declared in the national interest and
thus subject to federal jurisdiction. However, it appears that he was dissuaded
from doing so over fears that Québec nationalists would turn violent and
sabotage any transmission lines built in that province, even if they were federally
permitted.46 Tis left Newfoundland in a quandary: Te only way to guarantee
some the building of the transmission lines through Québec was to gain federal
support and oversight for the project.47 However, there were threats coming from
Québec that any attempt to order the province to allow Newfoundland to build
power lines on its land would be met with armed resistance, national interest or
not.48 Tus, if the federal government intervened, there was no guarantee that
Québec would comply.
But even as the rhetoric over the issue of allowing Newfoundland to build
transmission lines in Québec became increasingly heated and vitriolic on both
sides, Ottawa remained resolutely silent on the issue.49 As a result, the fnancial
situation for Churchill Falls’ provincial holding company became increasingly
dire, which put Québec and its provincial electric utility, Hydro-Québec,
in an excellent bargaining position. In 1969, Hydro-Québec purchased a
majority of shares in the holding company, becoming a majority interest holder
in the project, and entered into a power contract under which the utility agreed
to purchase the power generated at Churchill Falls for a set price, locked in for
sixty-fve years.50 Tis contract originally included a Newfoundland choice of law
provision, which was ultimately changed to Québec law.51 Although the terms of
the contract were considered favourable for Churchill Falls and Newfoundland
at the time, the contract has since become a source of great resentment and anger
in Newfoundland.
Much of this anger comes from what Québec chose to do with the surplus
power from Churchill Falls that it buys but does not need. From the outset,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibid at 230.
See ibid at 232.
See ibid at 232-33.
See ibid at 230-31.
See ibid at 233.
See ibid at 235. Te initial power purchase agreement was for forty years with an optional
twenty-fve-year extension, and by the end of negotiations, Québec had opted to extend the
life of the agreement for the full sixty-fve years. Te agreement will end in 2034 (ibid).
51. See ibid at 234.
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Newfoundland was aware that the electricity generated by Churchill Falls was
more than any one province, including itself, could possibly use (at least at the
time). After its plans to sell power to US utilities foundered, Newfoundland had
proposed to sell the electricity to other parts of Canada, including Québec and
Ontario. Under the power contract, however, Québec opted to buy all the power
generated by Churchill Falls, putting the determination of what to do with the
excess electricity into its own hands. Ultimately, Québec did not sell the excess
power to Ontario or the Maritimes, as Newfoundland had once considered doing.
Instead, Hydro-Québec entered into lucrative power purchase agreements (PPA)
with electric utilities in New England, selling the power from Newfoundland
to make a substantial proft for itself.52 As of 2016, Newfoundland had made
two billion Canadian dollars (CAD) selling Churchill Falls electricity to Québec,
while Québec had made 25.7 billion CAD selling that same electricity to the
United States.53 Newfoundland has challenged this lopsided arrangement on
several grounds over the years, but each attempt to undo or revise the contract
has thus far failed.54
Although there have been federal fnancial supports for electricity projects
within provinces, since Churchill Falls there seems to be little interest in
interprovincial transmission, both from the provinces and from the federal
government. On the federal side, this ambivalence can be seen in the fact that
the CER (like the National Energy Board (NEB) before it) does have an approval
process for interprovincial and international transmission lines, but only for
such lines that have been designated by an order in council—and, as Professor
Nigel Bankes has noted, “No such order has ever been issued.”55 Why the federal
government readily gets involved in international projects and not interprovincial
ones is a policy choice, since it has jurisdiction in both cases; but in the context
of Churchill Falls and for many provinces, sale of power to the United States

52. See James P Feehan & Melvin Baker, “Te Churchill Falls Contract and Why
Newfoundlanders Can’t Get Over It,” Policy Options (1 September 2010), online:
<policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/making-parliament-work/the-churchill-falls-contract-andwhy-newfoundlanders-cant-get-over-it> [perma.cc/CXC2-J2L2].
53. See “Arguments to Renegotiate Churchill Falls Met with Stern Questions in Supreme Court,”
CBC News (5 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/
supreme-court-canada-churchill-falls-hydro-quebec-1.4434485> [perma.cc/VHQ5-RDTS].
54. See e.g. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp v Hydro-Québec, 2018 SCC 46; Reference re Upper
Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 SCR 297.
55. See Nigel Bankes, “Pipelines and the Constitution: a Special Issue of the Review of
Constitutional Studies” (2018) 23 Rev Const Stud 1 at 14; CER Act, supra note 37, ss 10,
11(b); National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c N7, s 58.16.
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makes more economic sense than selling to other provinces.56 Tere are some
bright spots, including the buying and selling of power between Hydro-Québec
and Ontario and, to a lesser extent, between Alberta and British Columbia. Te
latter connection, however, is in desperate need of upgrading, which involves a
cost that would likely have to be borne on the Alberta side of the line given BC
Hydro’s massive investment in the Site C Dam project.57 Te more common
arrangement, however, is still to sell power to the United States.58
Te 1982 amendments to the Constitution Act, 1867 confrmed that
provinces have jurisdiction over their own electricity projects—including
transmission lines—that are only within their borders.59 Tus, in addition to the
general position taken by many provinces that they should exclusively self-supply
their own electricity, there may be some concern that increased federal interest
in interprovincial transmission lines could lead the CER to become more like
the US electricity regulator, FERC.60 Tis concern is addressed by the solution
proposed in Part III, below. Te more difcult problem is the political aspect
of provincially-owned utilities allowing the construction of transmission lines
in-province that they do not own. However, before considering what can be done
to increase the number of interprovincial connections, it is important to make a
case for why the federal government must urgently reconsider its abdication in
the electricity sector now. Tere are two policy issues in particular that call for an
urgent response: the country’s widespread energy poverty and the need to rapidly
decarbonize in order to meet the Paris Agreement targets and slow the pace of
climate change.

56. See Blue, supra note 2 at 341.
57. See Hydro-Québec, “Exchanges,” supra note 32; Justine Hunter, “Tree Viewpoints on the
Proposed B.C.-Alberta Hydro Link Project,” Te Globe and Mail (6 March 2016), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/three-viewpoints-on-the-proposed-bcalberta-hydro-link-project/article29043682> [perma.cc/T6VZ-K2ZD?type=image].
58. Note that the same connection between Hydro-Québec and Ontario is also touted by the
former as increasing its trade capacity to the United States. See Hydro-Québec, “Exchanges,”
supra note 32. Also, when Alberta and British Columbia were sparring over the Trans
Mountain expansion, Alberta threatened the possibility of ending power sales between the
provinces. See Justine Hunter & Carrie Tait, “Electricity Talks Between B.C. and Alberta
Broke Down Before the Pipeline Spat,” Te Globe and Mail (5 February 2018), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/electricity-talks-between-bc-and-albertabroke-down-before-pipeline-spat/article37869816> [perma.cc/C48M-HFEU?type=image].
59. CA, 1867, supra note 36, s 92A(1)(c).
60. Tis would perhaps be an ironic stance since any Canadian utility that sells power to the
United States must comply with FERC orders. See e.g. Blue, supra note 25 at 343.
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II. CANADA’S ENERGY INJUSTICE: THE ENERGY
TRANSITION CASE FOR A POLICY CHANGE
Te need for more interprovincial power lines is particularly acute at this moment,
as they could connect more renewable power generation and help the country to
achieve its national commitments to curb carbon emissions. Increased east-west
interprovincial connections would also accelerate major shifts from fossil fuels
to renewable energy sources like wind and solar in the Prairie provinces and in
Atlantic Canada.61 From an emissions reduction perspective, electricity is a prime
target for aggressive emissions reductions, as other sectors like transportation and
oil and gas pose a greater challenge. As a large, cold country with an intensely
urban population, making a dent in hydrocarbon energy use and associated
emissions related to land, sea, and air transportation and heating is difcult
(although the pandemic certainly curtailed the use of jet fuel).62 While increasing
the use of renewable power sources in these sectors is achievable, it is likely to be
a long road. By contrast, Canada is uniquely positioned to radically decarbonize
its electricity sector.
Te starting point for emissions from the electricity sector, taken on a
national scale, is already relatively low because of the use of large-scale hydropower
and, to a lesser extent, nuclear power facilities, both of which Canada has in
abundance.63 With nearly 80 per cent of its electricity generated by non-fossil fuel
sources, specifcally hydropower and nuclear, Canada can perhaps be forgiven
for not devoting as much public debate to improving the carbon footprint of its
electricity infrastructure as it has to its fossil fuel transportation infrastructure.
However, the country owes most of its low greenhouse gases (GHGs) electricity

61. See Marcia Valiante, “A Greener Grid? Canadian Policies for Renewable Power and Prospects
for a National Sustainable Electricity Strategy” (2013) 25 J Envtl L & Prac 41 at 42.
62. Tis is especially true since Canadian car buyers prefer larger vehicles. See Timothy Cain,
“Canada’s 5 Biggest Auto Segments—and Teir Leaders—in 2020’s First Half,” Driving (10
August 2020), online: <driving.ca/column/driving-by-numbers/canadas-5-biggest-autosegments-and-their-leaders-in-2020s-frst-half> [perma.cc/YQ5C-KLFF] (noting that of
the fve top-selling vehicle categories, only one is not a type of truck or SUV, and that most
subcompact vehicles are no longer sold in Canada). On the curtailing of the use of jet fuel,
seeInternational Energy Agency, “Global Energy Review 2021: Oil” (2021), online: <www.
iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2021/oil> [perma.cc/WNF6-JGND].
63. See Natural Resources Canada, “Energy Facts” (last modifed 23 December 2021),
online: Government of Canada <www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-and-data/data-and-analysis/
energy-data-and-analysis/energy-facts/20061> [perma.cc/Z68C-ZXAG] [NRC,
“Energy Facts”].
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to hydropower, and thus far, has largely neglected the tremendous wind and solar
resources that more interprovincial transmission lines could help to unlock.64
Since each province has its own electricity grid with only a small number of
interties (that is, interprovincial connections), the power being sent to homes and
businesses in any location is most likely coming from within the province. Tis is,
in some cases, by design—British Columbia, for example, was explicit in its policy
of being self-reliant for its renewable power needs.65 Tis not only means that a
province dependent on hydrocarbons, like Alberta, cannot simply replace part of
that generation with clean electricity from neighbouring British Columbia, but
it also means that generation planning decisions—that is, deciding what power
plants will be built and where—are determined by most provinces based on their
own resources, expertise, and needs. As a result, provinces that have considerable
experience with large-scale hydropower dams may be focused on building only
these kinds of facilities instead of branching out into wind, solar, and other types
of renewables (power which they instead buy from privately-owned facilities).66
Hydropower-rich provinces are interested in buying wind and solar power;
they just do not seem to be interested in buying it from other provinces (or
generators located in other provinces). Wind and solar can be very efective
ways for provinces to balance peak and load-following electricity demand when
hydropower provides baseload (that is, the average amount of power needed daily)
generation. And the interest is there: Ontario used its now-cancelled feed-in tarif
program to encourage private investment in wind and solar within the province,
while British Columbia has announced that it will buy solar power from California
and Washington.67 It will not, however, buy from Alberta because its neighbour

64. See Christopher Barrington-Leigh & Mark Ouilaris, “Te Renewable Energy Landscape in
Canada: A Spatial Analysis” (2017) 75 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Rev 809 at 809-12;
Tony Seskus, “Alberta could Lead Canada in Wind and Solar Power by 2025, Expert Says,”
CBC News (21 September 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/business/alberta-wind-andsolar-future-1.5728757> [perma.cc/5PXG-FHC9].
65. See Bill 17, Clean Energy Amendment Act, 2020, 5th Sess, 41st Parl, British
Columbia, 2020, cl 1.
66. See e.g. Randy Shore, “B.C. Government Putting Alternative Energy Sector
on Ice,” Vancouver Sun (14 February 2019), online: <vancouversun.com/news/
local-news/b-c-government-putting-alternative-energy-sector-on-ice> [perma.
cc/75KK-SWYA]; Hydro-Québec, “Québec Hydropower: Clean, Renewable and Low
in GHG Emissions” (n.d.), online: <www.hydroquebec.com/about/our-energy.html>
[perma.cc/S3KY-NNKS].
67. Cox, “Clean BC,” supra note 29.
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province still relies primarily on coal and natural gas for its wholesale power.68
Although buying from Alberta wind and solar providers might encourage more
wind and solar investment within Alberta, the lack of an interprovincial power
trade means that there are no market forces incentivizing British Columbia to
buy from another province as opposed to from the United States.
If Canada did have top-down incentivizing of a robust trade in wind, solar, and
other non-hydro renewables, it would be possible to help provinces like Alberta
to “green” their grids and transition to more wind and solar power while also
encouraging the export of that clean power to British Columbia and Saskatchewan,
both of which could use it (and politics aside, would presumably want to use it
if it were cheaper than existing sources). Tis, in turn, would encourage more
investment in privately-owned wind and solar generation facilities in provinces
like Alberta, jumpstarting the renewable energy sector, adding jobs, and bringing
Canada even closer to an entirely decarbonized electricity sector, which would
be a truly remarkable feat. Increasing the role of the federal government without
staging a federal takeover of the entire electricity transmission sector à la FERC
could lay the groundwork for this kind of transformation.

III. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR ADDING SIGNIFICANT
INTERPROVINCIAL TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE
Te economic case for the long-term fnancial gains of adding more interprovincial
transmission lines is compelling. In a 2019 report, it was estimated that if the
federal government invested 1.7 billion CAD (an amount that the Canadian
Infrastructure Bank has indicated it would be willing to supply) in interprovincial
transmission projects, that investment would attract an additional 6.6 billion
CAD in private investment to fnance the transmission alone.69 Tis would
bring in an additional 92.5 billion CAD over ten years in public and private
money to build the renewable power plants that would be needed to completely
decarbonize the country’s electricity sector as a whole.70 If it were possible to,
68. Ibid. Both Washington and California do use coal and natural gas in their power mixes, and
both states are connected to the states surrounding them by interstate transmission lines.
Because electricity from all sources, renewable and non-renewable, is identical, once the
electricity is in an interconnected transmission line it is often impossible to say for certain
where it came from. See ibid.
69. See Ralph Torrie & Céline Bak, “Building Back Better with a Green Power Wave,” Corporate
Knights (29 April 2020), online: <www.corporateknights.com/responsible-investing/
building-back-better-green-power-wave> [perma.cc/TH7N-RNR9].
70. See ibid.
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for example, build a wind farm in Alberta that could provide electricity to BC
Hydro under a PPA, such a project would create jobs in one province and provide
low-cost renewable generation to another.71
However, it will not be easy to persuade provinces, many of which have
already invested in exporting power to the United States, that investing money in
buying and selling power from other provinces makes fnancial sense, especially
when power has historically been an area of high provincial protectionism.72
Again, that protectionism is likely the product of so many provincially owned
utilities, which tie the economics of the electricity sector tightly to provincial
budgets and add a political dimension to electricity projects.73 Tus, when a
provincial utility builds more transmission lines, it is not with the anticipation
of buying power from another province, which would involve additional expense
in the form of PPAs and more jobs in another jurisdiction (and, potentially,
reciprocity—if a province allows you to build a line in their jurisdiction, you
must allow them to do the same).
On the other hand, the power generation sector is competitive in Alberta,
with most facilities owned by private companies that are proft-driven. Te
mismatch between provincially-owned power on one side of the border and
privately-owned power on the other could raise concerns about prices on both
sides, though it should be noted again that many provinces with provincial
utilities have also been buying power and connecting to investor-owned utilities
for decades, both within their own borders and in the United States.74 So,
while provinces would need to take a cooperative stance with each other on
interprovincial power, there is precedent for such cooperation with US-based
utilities. Furthermore, this is why federal investment and participation are so
important: Te provinces tend to be protective of their own utilities and there
is little appetite for funding expensive transmission lines to reach ratepayers in

71. Shawn McCarthy, “Roundtable: Greening Canada’s Electricity Could Help Kickstart
Economy,” Corporate Knights (29 April 2020), online: <www.corporateknights.com/
built-environment/green-recovery-roundtable-greening-canadas-electricity-sector-centralkickstarting-economy> [perma.cc/KMX7-2CX8].
72. See Jim Burpee, “Investment in Electricity Sector Could be Just What We Need to
Jump-Start Economic Activity,” Te Globe and Mail (15 July 2020), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-investment-in-electricity-sector-couldbe-just-what-we-need-to-jump> [perma.cc/SVZ5-BLDA].
73. See Blue, supra note 2 at 340-41.
74. See ibid at 343.
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other provinces. Federal permitting of interprovincial transmission would defray
the costs to provinces while encouraging private investment.75
Additionally, if successful, the rush to promote electric vehicles will require
provinces to add more electricity capacity in the next few decades. Instead of
staying with the currently prevailing approach, which would be to build more
controversial hydropower projects or to import power from the United States,
adding more interprovincial power lines and buying and selling renewable
electricity within the country could connect populous areas to the places where
generating wind and solar power are cheapest.76 Even in the United States,
where building interstate transmission is more straightforward from a regulatory
standpoint, the risk that projects will not cover their costs means that any added
uncertainty makes these projects even more costly.77 Without some movement
towards building a national electricity market in Canada, there is little reason for
investors to believe that the country’s provincial protectionism still justifes putting
money into projects here. Tis makes provinces more and more dependent on
the United States as an electricity trading partner while neglecting the economic
possibilities of a national power grid.
At present, interprovincial transmission lines are dependent on cooperation
between provinces, which has thus far resulted in only a small number of east-west
connections. Trying to add more interprovincial transmission that would spur
investment in renewables and community-owned projects requires thinking
outside of what any one province has traditionally done to supply electricity to
its residents, which is where the exercise of the federal government’s jurisdiction
over these lines could make a real diference. Spurring private investment in
Canadian transmission and renewable power projects is needed because, as has
been discussed throughout this article, provincial utilities are unlikely to approve
of passing the cost of such lines to existing ratepayers, as the ratepayers will not
receive direct benefts. Tat does not mean there are not benefts to be had, but
75. Te need for federal funding in this space has been generally acknowledged, even when
potential benefts of federal regulation in the area have not. See Burpee, supra note 72; Jan
Carr, “Power Sharing: Developing Inter-Provincial Electricity Trade” (July 2010) CD Howe
Institute Commentary No 306 at 13; Brian Topp, “A National Energy Grid Would Be a
Clean Win for Canada,” Policy Options (18 January 2019), online: <policyoptions.irpp.
org/magazines/january-2019/a-national-energy-grid-would-be-a-clean-win-for-canada>
[perma.cc/6HW3-82EU] (“Progress could be made by introducing a new player—a national
player—with a public interest mandate sensitive to the economic and fscal pressures at play,
and prepared to partner with incumbents to give them an opportunity to evolve into useful
components of a more integrated national system.”).
76. See Coleman, supra note 23 at 265.
77. See ibid at 293.
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the primary mandate of many utilities is to keep power bills low. It could also
be that many decades of provincially-segmented grids have resulted in a lack of
imagination when it comes to the benefts of interprovincial electricity trade.
As such, the number of interprovincial projects thus far is too small to realize real
economic gains from interprovincial power trade.78

IV. CANADA’S ENERGY PERSISTENT POVERTY:
THE JUSTICE CASE FOR A POLICY CHANGE
More interprovincial transmission lines could also help of-grid communities,
either by connecting them to the grid or, perhaps more signifcantly, by providing
more investment opportunities for community-owned projects.79 Although
the issues discussed in this Part would not be directly addressed by more
interprovincial transmission lines—at least, not in a comprehensive way—the
creation of a national electricity grid and, by extension, a national electricity
market, could encourage the entry of First Nations, other Indigenous, and rural
communities to enter this market.
When communities are referred to as being “of the grid” or “of-grid,” it means
that the community is in an area that is not serviced by transmission lines. When
this is the case, the community does not have access to electricity from power
plants and must instead use small-scale generation. For most remote Canadian
communities—many of which are Indigenous—this means diesel-powered
generators.80 However, this is not always the solution. In Yukon and Northwest
Territories, micro-hydro projects (in which turbines are placed in running water
to generate electricity) provide much of the power to residents in Whitehorse and
Yellowknife; but in the majority of remote communities, renewables are either
too expensive for the community to implement, or conditions in the area make
78. See Jan Carr, “Power to the (Other) Provinces,” Te Globe and Mail (30 July 2010), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/power-to-the-other-provinces/article4324201>
[perma.cc/597G-JJBY].
79. Te federal government has recognized the potential value of interprovincial and
international connections to the Territories (specifcally, transmission lines from Manitoba
and Alaska), although none yet exist. See Senate, Standing Committee on Energy, the
Environment and Natural Resources, Powering Canada’s Territories, 41-2 (June 2015) at 27,
39 (Hon Paul J Massicotte & Hon Richard Neufeld).
80. See Canada Energy Regulator, “Market Snapshot: Overcoming the Challenges of Powering
Canada’s Of-Grid Communities” (3 October 2018), online: <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/
data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2018/market-snapshot-overcomingchallenges-powering-canadas-of-grid-communities.html> [perma.cc/8K68-MD6P].
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them inefcient.81 Tere is also a certain amount of distrust among remote and
rural communities about moving of of diesel since, for all its faws, they have
relied on it for years.82
Te problem is not only in the territories—rural communities in all provinces
are underserved. Some areas are served by rural electricity co-operatives that were
primarily established in the 1970s, but slow growth of these programs since then
means that many communities cannot connect to co-operatives as there are none
close by, so they must be self-sufcient.83 As with interprovincial connections
more generally, the fact that most provinces that have their own electric utilities
are answerable to taxpayers for expensive transmission projects means that
there is little incentive to connect a small number of new ratepayers. Even
investor-owned utilities, like the ones in Alberta, may have shareholders who are
similarly uninterested in spending large amounts of capital for infrastructure that
would reach few paying customers.84
Te current economic picture of building new transmission infrastructure
has thus left many, if not most, rural communities without access to non-diesel
power unless they are able to self-fnance an energy infrastructure (which, all
too often, they cannot). Additionally, if we want to see communities that are
dependent on fossil fuels for electricity production move to integrate more
renewable power, in some cases this would require new transmission lines to
connect these sources to communities, at least where the existing transmission
system is relatively close. Additionally, communities like this could also use
these connections to sell excess renewable power back to the utilities, providing
an economic boost. A path forward for a national electricity market, driven by
81. See Jimmy Tomson, “How can Canada’s North Get Of Diesel?,” Te Narwhal (11 February
2019), online: <thenarwhal.ca/how-canadas-north-get-of-diesel> [perma.cc/9R9T-A7BN].
82. See ibid.
83. See Alastair Lucas, “Te Challenge of Rural Electrifcation in Canada” in Iñigo del Guayo et
al, eds, Energy Justice and Energy Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) 239.
84. Indeed, in Alberta, the Alberta Utilities Commission does an economic analysis of all
options before approving the connection of remote communities to the grid. See e.g.
Decision on Preliminary Question: Application for Review of Decision 22125-D01-2018: Jasper
Interconnection Project (13 November 2018), Decision 23715-D01-2018, online: Alberta
Utilities Commission <www.auc.ab.ca/regulatory_documents/Lists/eFiling%20Documents/
DispForm.aspx?ID=6451> (in which the AUC ultimately approved a transmission line
connection to the remote community of Jasper, after considering several alternatives and
determining them to be less cost-efective). Alberta does have more transmission in rural
parts of the province than its neighbours, likely because of the need to connect oil sands
projects. See Dave Lovekin & Dylan Heerema, “Diesel, Renewables, and the Future of
Canada’s Remote Communities” (15 January 2019), online (blog): Pembina Institute <www.
pembina.org/blog/remote-microgrids-intro> [perma.cc/78UW-H97X].
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both public and private investment in interprovincial transmission lines, could
help provide an economic beneft to communities that are interested in both
supplying their own power and selling the surplus.
Tis leads to a bleak truth: Canada has a problem with persistent energy
injustice, specifcally in the form of diesel dependency.85 Tough normally
thought of as applying to the developing world, energy poverty refers to the
lack of universal access to electricity and the developmental implications of
that lack.86 When a community does not have access to safe, reliable electricity,
it impacts the substantive freedoms of its members, restricting their access to
the educational and economic opportunities that the wider population takes
for granted.87 Hospitals, schools, and other large buildings and facilities require
more power than diesel generators alone can handle, especially when those same
generators are also the source of power for the rest of the community. Where
there are schools, they may not have access to power when diesel needs to be
rationed. Access to electricity does not mean that these issues will be resolved for
communities, but curing this defciency is one step towards bringing areas out of
poverty.88 It is also crucial to keep in mind that even though communities should
have access to reliable, safe, and consistent electricity, energy projects that are
aimed at addressing this problem must also be evaluated in terms of benefts and
burdens, community buy-in, the duty to consult, and environmental impact.89
In Canada, Indigenous Peoples are often isolated in remote or rural areas
where transmission lines do not reach, preventing access to electricity from
large power plants or dams.90 It is estimated that around 70 per cent of the
85. See Dayna Nadine Scott, “Environmental Justice” in David Coghlan & Mary Brydon-Miller,
eds, Te SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research (SAGE, 2014) 299 at 299.
86. See Antoine Half, Benjamin K Sovacool, Jon Rozhon, “Introduction: Te End of Energy
Poverty: Pathways to Development” in Antoine Half, Benjamin K Sovacool, Jon Rozhon,
eds, Energy Poverty: Global Challenges and Local Solutions (Oxford University Press, 2014) 1
at 1-4. Note that there are difering defnitions of energy poverty, primarily stemming from
the traditional economic lens through which poverty is measured. See Benjamin K Sovacool,
“Te Political Economy of Energy Poverty: A Review of Key Challenges” (2012) 16 Energy
for Sustainable Development 272 at 273.
87. See Half, Sovacool & Rozhon, supra note 86 at 3.
88. See ibid at 4-5.
89. As Dayna Scott and Adrian Smith have noted, deep distrust of government, past
environmental and health damage, and concern over land use issues (among other factors)
have led to resistance against renewable energy projects in some Indigenous communities
in Ontario. See Dayna Scott & Adrian A Smith, ’‘Sacrifce Zones’ in the Green Energy
Economy: Toward an Environmental Justice Framework” (2017) 62 McGill LJ 861 at
871-72 [Scott & Smith, “Sacrifce Zones”].
90. See ibid.

652

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

country’s rural communities, many of which are Indigenous, are of-grid.91 Tis
problem is not unique to Canada; in the United States, many Native American
reservations also do not have access to the grid. Further, as in Canada, the US
federal government has not shown much interest in remedying that situation.92
Full participation in modern life in Canada requires twenty-four-hour access to
electricity,93 and yet many Indigenous and rural communities do not have this
luxury, which most Canadians take for granted.94 Te ability to be economically
self-sufcient is also dependent on access to reliable electricity, as community
growth is constrained by limitations on how many buildings can be powered.95
Most of-grid communities use diesel-powered generators as their primary
source of electricity.96 Diesel is not reliable—shipments can be spilled or delayed,
only certain quantities may be stored, prices are not stable—and if generators
cannot run because there is not enough fuel or because repairs are needed, then
schools and other services must close, and other essential services may not be
available.97 Ten there is the cost. Te average on-grid electricity rate in British
Columbia is 0.126 CAD/kWh.98 Te average price for diesel-generated electricity
is signifcantly higher—in British Columbia, for example, the average rate for
diesel power is 0.37 CAD/kWh, roughly three times more expensive, even with

91. Natural Resources Canada, “Te Atlas of Canada - Remote Communities Database” (last
modifed 3 August 2018), online: Government of Canada <atlas.gc.ca/rced-bdece/en/
index.html> [perma.cc/BPN2-S2L4]. Also note that many diesel-dependent Indigenous
communities in British Columbia are not far from the United States border or Vancouver,
but they are still not connected to BC Hydro’s transmission lines. See ibid.
92. See Catherine JK Sandoval, “Energy Access is Energy Justice: Te Yurok Tribe’s Trailblazing
Work to Close the Native American Reservation Electricity Gap” in Raya Salter, Carmen
G Gonzalez & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, eds, Energy Justice: US and International
Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2018) 166 at 169-70. Note that the Canadian government has
taken steps to provide funding programs for transitioning of of diesel, but there has not been
any federal or provincial work done to provide access to the grid for these communities.
93. Ibid.
94. See James Knowles, Power Shift: Electricity for Canada’s Remote Communities (Te Conference
Board of Canada, 27 September 2016) at ii (“It is probably fair to say that most Canadians
take electricity for granted. For the 99 per cent of the population that is connected to North
America’s electricity grid, access to electricity is guaranteed and reliable, and electricity costs
make up only a small portion of the total cost of living.”).
95. See Sandoval, supra note 92 at 2.
96. See Lovekin & Heerema, supra note 84.
97. See ibid.
98. See Rylan Urban, “Electricity Prices in Canada 2021” (last modifed 11 March 2021), online:
<energyhub.org/electricity-prices> [perma.cc/3DMV-BJZH].
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subsidies.99 With so much of a community’s costs eaten up by maintaining diesel
supply, it is difcult to set aside money to transition to another electricity source
or even to consider doing so.100
Te dollar cost of diesel does not include its health costs. It is true that remote
communities are small in population and thus in carbon footprint, but burning
diesel emits dangerous compounds like black carbon.101 Black carbon is an intense
GHG containing particulate matter which, when inhaled by humans, can be
absorbed by the lungs and enter the bloodstream, causing cardiovascular disease
and premature death.102 Diesel thus not only limits opportunity and growth for
communities but it can also, ultimately, cost community members years from
their lives. Tis is particularly chilling considering the environmental and health
damage that some remote communities have already sufered as the result of
energy projects, diesel spills, chemical plants, and other factors or events.103
Exacerbating the health efects of burning diesel is the damage that can
be caused to both human bodies and the environment by exposure to diesel
spills. Tere is no exact count of how many diesel spills have occurred in remote
communities because of bureaucratic tangles over which federal and provincial
agencies keep track of such events, but it may easily number in the hundreds
across the country in a given year.104 While some of the spills are likely small, any
spill has the potential to contaminate the soil. Contamination can also be caused
by leakages in diesel storage tanks. Tis contamination can have a serious negative
impact on wildlife and local fora, which can undermine commercial activities
99. Tis rate is from 2005, the most recent rate I was able to fnd for of-grid communities
in British Columbia. See Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Status of Remote/Of-Grid
Communities in Canada: August 2011, by Jimmy Royer (Natural Resources Canada, 2011)
at 10/44, online (pdf ): <www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/fles/canmetenergy/fles/
pubs/2013-118_en.pdf> [perma.cc/LXS5-SRVU].
100. See ibid.
101. See Sandoval, supra note 92 at 172-73.
102. See World Health Organization, Preventing Disease Trough Healthy Environments, A Global
Assessment of the Burden of Disease from Environmental Risks (WHO, May 2014) at 61.
Te WHO report refers to “particulate matter,” which includes black carbon. See also US
Environmental Protection Agency, “Black Carbon Research” (last modifed 23 September
2016), online: <19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/air-research/black-carbon-research_.html>
[perma.cc/BC96-2CC3].
103. Tese areas are called “sacrifce zones,” because they have been made to bear the burden of
projects that beneft other, often more populous areas and wealthy companies. See Scott &
Smith, “Sacrifce Zones,” supra note 89 at 866.
104. See Christopher Pollon, “Why Nobody Seems to know Canada’s Total Number of Diesel
Spills,” Te Discourse (2 December 2017), online: <thediscourse.ca/energy/how-many-dieselspills-happen-canada-every-year-nobody-knows> [perma.cc/6VAR-E699].
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and foodways for rural and remote communities, and the cost of cleanup can
be immense.105 In Ontario, at least two First Nations have declared diesel spill
emergencies in the past decade.106
Tis kind of racially- and economically-based disproportionate treatment
of remote and Indigenous Peoples is also contrary to eforts at reconciliation
and extends the country’s track record of neglecting Indigenous communities
and its obligations to them. Te fact that there is an economic rationale is no
answer to this imbalance, although it is the reason it is likely to continue without
policy changes.107 Te unequal treatment of Indigenous and rural communities
is especially glaring when considering major provincial power projects like Site
C in British Columbia and Muskrat Falls in Newfoundland, both of which will
generate massive amounts of electricity and neither of which will send any of
that electricity to currently of-grid communities.108 But again, provinces are not
interested in bearing the costs of connecting of-grid communities, at least not
alone, nor are they incentivized to help of-grid communities transition away
from diesel. And, while some First Nations do want to transition to renewable
energy and even become electricity exporters, provinces do not generally consider
this when planning new infrastructure projects.109
Te federal government is aware of the problems associated with diesel fuel
use, but its focus is on funding solutions, not implementing them. As part of
the Pan Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, Natural
105. See e.g. Stephanie E Chang et al, “Consequences of Oil Spills: A Review and Framework for
Informing Planning” (2014) 19 Ecology & Society 26 at 34.
106. See Sunny Freeman, “Industry and Indigenous Communities Let the Sun in on the
Shared Problem of Diesel,” Financial Post (6 January 2017), online: <fnancialpost.com/
commodities/energy/industry-and-indigenous-communities-let-the-sun-in-on-the-sharedproblem-of-diesel> [perma.cc/4KTK-LFH6].
107. See Lucas, supra note 83.
108. See Kyle Greenham, “Of the Grid: Southern Labrador Communities Struggle with
Diesel Generators,” Saltwire (12 October 2017), online: <www.saltwire.com/news/local/
of-the-grid-southern-labrador-communities-struggle-with-diesel-generators-155168>
[perma.cc/MK8K-YHFU].
109. See e.g. James Wilt, “Canada’s Commitment of $220 Million to Transition Remote
Communities Of Diesel a Mere ‘Drop in the Bucket,’” Te Narwhal (6 March 2018),
online: <thenarwhal.ca/canada-s-commitment-220-million-transition-remote-communitiesdiesel-mere-drop-bucket> [perma.cc/AFL7-QT8R] (regarding British Columbia and BC
Hydro’s decision to go ahead with the Site C dam project, which made the possibility of
supplying the needed power from Indigenous-owned renewable projects moot). See also
Sarah Cox, “B.C. First Nations Forced to Shelve Clean Energy Projects as Site C Dam
Overloads Grid,” Te Narwhal (25 June 2018), online: <thenarwhal.ca/b-c-frst-nationsforced-shelve-clean-energy-projects-site-c-dam-overloads-grid> [perma.cc/579J-V642].
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Resources Canada was allocated 220 million CAD in funding over six years to
help of-grid communities transition away from diesel.110 Tere are also other
funding initiatives being administered both federal and through federal-provincial
partnerships,111 but all of these programs sufer from the same faw: Tey do
nothing to change the underlying structural problems that have created the
country’s energy poverty in the frst place—the provinces remain the only actors
in the regulation and approval of electricity transmission line projects. Money is
all well and good, but the federal government currently cannot guarantee that
projects will in fact be permitted.
Te plight of of-grid communities is not the only problem to which the
provincial domination in transmission has contributed. As long as the decisions
about transmission planning are left only to provinces, the status of remote and
of-grid communities is unlikely to change. However, as noted in Part III, above,
at least one study indicates that increased interprovincial electricity trade could
bring signifcant investment in renewable projects more broadly, which could
result in more money for smaller-scale projects that use renewable or cleaner
energy sources, even if they are not connected to the grid.112 For Indigenous
communities in particular, a rethinking of the provincial dominance over electricity
connections could present the opportunity to take an equity or full ownership
stake in such projects, which in turn could provide a much-needed economic
boost. While some communities could be connected to new interprovincial
transmission lines directly, the possibility of a national market for electricity also
provides an opportunity for Indigenous communities to be both self-sufcient
power producers and sellers of the surplus electricity they generate.113

110. See Government of Canada, “Clean Energy for Rural and Remote Communities: BioHeat,
Demonstration & Deployment Program Streams” (last modifed 28 October 2020), online:
<www.nrcan.gc.ca/reducingdiesel> [perma.cc/Q3LL-PUVJ].
111. See Natural Resources Canada, “Funding, Grants, and Incentives” (last modifed
04 May 2021), online: Government of Canada <www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-and-data/
funding-partnerships/funding-opportunities/funding-grants-incentives/4943>
[perma.cc/WM9U-AVSX].
112. See McCarthy, supra note 71.
113. For many of-grid communities in British Columbia, for example, there is a strong resistance
among Indigenous communities to being connected by BC Hydro, as this would make the
communities dependent on BC Hydro’s decisions, which often include diesel generation
instead of renewables or transmission connection. See Maryam Rezaei & Hadi Dowlatabadi,
“Of-Grid: Community Energy and the Pursuit of Self-Sufciency in British Columbia’s
Remote and First Nations Communities” (2016) 21 Local Environment 789 at 796-97.
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Tese potential economic gains, in turn, could play an important role in
increasing Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination.114 Having safe,
reliable, on-demand electricity is needed for communities to grow economically
and provide opportunities for members. Additionally, many First Nations and
other Indigenous communities are interested in wind and solar ownership and
investment, which can be used on a microgrid to power only the surrounding
homes and businesses.115 If there were potential to sell the power, either via
provincial- or privately-owned transmission lines, communities could invest
in larger scale wind and solar projects to generate an electricity surplus. Tis
would allow communities to sell that power to other communities or to utilities
(potentially even utilities in other provinces, if such lines were easier and more
economic to build). But in order to send wind or solar-generated power over even
moderate distances, transmission lines would be necessary.
Indeed, it is generally true that adding more wind and solar to any
jurisdiction’s power mix requires new transmission infrastructure, and opposition
to that infrastructure can stall transition away from hydrocarbon power sources.116
Despite the challenges, the number of Indigenous-owned renewable projects is
growing. In Alberta, some First Nations have even taken an ownership stake in

114. See ibid. Adrian A Smith and Dayna Nadine Scott have done feld work with Indigenous
communities undertaking renewable projects as either part or full owners, and conclude
that sovereignty is a major reason why communities rally around these kinds of projects.
See “Energy without Injustice? Indigenous Participation in Renewable Energy Generation”
in Sumudu A Atapattu, Carmen G Gonzalez, Sara L Seck, eds, Te Cambridge Handbook of
Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development (Cambridge University Press, 2021) 383.
115. See Canadian Institute for Climate Choices, “Waves of Change: Indigenous Clean Energy
Leadership for Canada’s Clean, Electric Future” (February 2022) at 5-8, online (pdf ):
<climatechoices.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ICE-report-ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf>
[perma.cc/J7ZK-F6HZ].
116. See Alexandra B Klass & Elizabeth J Wilson, “Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch” (2012) 65 Vand L Rev 1801 at 1811 (a Texas
Energy Stakeholder stated that “[t]he list of top three [challenges] for wind industry I would
say: transmission, transmission and transmission” at 1802).
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transmission lines that cross their reserves.117 But similar opportunities for rural
and remote Indigenous communities in other provinces to own transmission
lines or export electricity are more limited, as the other provinces generally have
a near-total monopoly on transmission and may not factor in how their capacity
planning negatively impacts these types of projects.118 Without a national market
for electricity, remote and Indigenous communities are at the mercy of provincial
politics and priorities when it comes to electricity.

V. USING FEDERAL TRANSMISSION LINE JURISDICTION TO
CREATE A NEW INTERPROVINCIAL ELECTRICITY PLAN
As noted, the federal government already contemplates its authority over
interprovincial transmission lines under the enabling regulation of both the NEB
and its successor, the CER.119 As with other interprovincial undertakings, the
federal government has the power to regulate interprovincial transmission lines
as they are “Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other
117. In Alberta, for example, AltaLink (a private transmission line company owned by Berkshire
Hathaway) and the Piikani First Nation came to an agreement giving the Piikani an
ownership stake in transmission lines that crossed their reserve by forming a joint venture,
PiikaniLink. See AltaLink, News Release, “Limited Partnership Provides Valuable New
Revenue for Piikani Nation” (4 June 2019), online: <www.altalink.ca/news/news-releases.
cfm?releasePage=06042019135315> [perma.cc/SVD3-L68Z]. See also Jefrey Jones,
“Indigenous Groups Continue Move Into Energy Industry, Acquiring 40% of Major
Alberta Transmission Line,” Te Globe and Mail (23 September 2019), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/business/article-tk-atco> [perma.cc/74WH-JSDT?type=image]
(detailing a 40 per cent stake in a major transmission line from Fort MacMurray to just
west of Edmonton by the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, Bigstone Cree Nation, Gunn
Métis Local 55, Mikisew Cree First Nation, Paul First Nation, Sawridge First Nation,
and Sucker Creek First Nation). Tere are also a number of Alberta Utilities Commission
decisions on Indigenous ownership of transmission facilities. See e.g. Canadian Utilities
Limited and Genesee Lake Holding Corp: Application for the Sale of Alberta PowerLine
Limited Partnership (29 November 2019), Decision No 24792-D01-2019, online: Alberta
Utilities Commission <www.auc.ab.ca/regulatory_documents/Lists/eFiling%20Documents/
DispForm.aspx?ID=7819> (granting the sale of interest in a transmission line company
to a holding company formed by a group of First Nations and recognizing that holding
company as a utility).
118. See Cox, supra note 109.
119. See Alastair R Lucas, “Te National Energy Board and Energy Infrastructure Regulation:
History, Legal Authority, and Judicial Supervision” (2018) 23 Rev Const Stud 25 at 38-39.
Lucas notes that, although the NEB (and its successor, the CER) has comprehensive
regulatory authority over interprovincial pipelines, it does not exert the same authority over
interprovincial transmission lines (ibid at 29-32).
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or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province.”120
Since the federal government has never attempted to regulate an interprovincial
transmission line, there is no confrmation from the Supreme Court of Canada
that this section provides jurisdiction, but the Court has afrmed exclusive federal
jurisdiction over similar projects and over interprovincial crude oil pipelines in
particular.121 Additionally, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA) suggests both that
federal jurisdiction over interprovincial transmission lines may be in the national
interest, and that an increased role for the federal government in the electricity
space would not be constitutionally unprecedented.122
In fact, there are many interconnections between individual provinces
and US states, such as British Columbia (which sells power to the state of
Washington), Manitoba (which is part of MISO, the Mid-continent Independent
System Operator, along with ffteen US states) and Québec (which has several
interconnections to New England and, in 2021, won a lucrative contract to sell
power to Massachusetts).123 But why has there been no order in council directing
the CER to review transmission lines running from, say, British Columbia to
Washington state but not to Alberta? Te reasons for this may have their roots in
a political battle between provinces that took place decades ago and the federal
government’s refusal to intervene. It may also be true that when abdication of
jurisdiction goes on long enough, it becomes increasingly difcult to displace
provincial dominance in the area, politically and practically.
It thus falls to the federal government to take up its jurisdiction over
interprovincial transmission lines in order to make a national power market
a reality. Tis part will make out the constitutional case for regulation of
interprovincial transmission lines under the Constitution Act, 1867. It will
120.
121.
122.
123.

CA, 1867, supra note 36, s 92(10)(a).
See RREMA, SCC, supra note 8 (denying appeal based on the lower court’s reasons).
References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 [GGPPA].
See House of Commons, supra note 31; BC Hydro, “International Power Lines” (n.d.),
online: <www.bchydro.com/energy-in-bc/operations/international-power-lines.html>
[perma.cc/3JFD-BBPG]; Midcontinent Independent System Operator, “About MISO”
(n.d.), online: <www.misoenergy.org/about> [perma.cc/J5UV-3BNJ]; Tara Lohan, “Is
New England’s Biggest Renewable Energy Project Really a Win for the Climate?,” Te
Revelator (24 September 2020), online: <therevelator.org/hydropower-necec> [perma.
cc/5PYK-AYZ9]. But note that Hydro-Québec’s proposed transmission line to its
hydropower to Massachusetts may have been quashed by Maine voters. See Associated Press,
“Construction Halted on $1B Hydro-Québec Transmission Line Project in Maine,” CBC
News (19 November 2021), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/maine-hydropowertransmission-corrider-1.6256557> [perma.cc/KD8H-FSBL].
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also explain why such regulation would not result in a federal takeover of all
transmission lines in the country, as has happened in the United States. Te
primary basis on which an interprovincial transmission line falls under federal
jurisdiction is interprovincial works. Tis could also provide a basis by which
federal jurisdiction could potentially be extended to any provincial transmission
line to which the interprovincial line connects.124 But, at the same time, this basis
for jurisdiction also provides a roadmap to limiting federal jurisdiction to that
interprovincial line only, even if it does connect to existing provincial lines for the
purpose of buying and selling power.125 It should also be noted here that if federal
jurisdiction over the interprovincial transmission line itself were established,
the CER would already have the authority to permit such lines, as well as a
process for doing so.126
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER
INTERPROVINCIAL TRANSMISSION LINES

When the federal government has asserted its jurisdiction over interprovincial
energy projects, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld this assertion.
In Reference re Environmental Management Act, British Columbia passed
legislation intended to put limits on shipment of heavy oil from Alberta
through the province on the basis of the province’s power to issue environmental
protections.127 Te federal government argued that this constituted attempted
provincial regulation of an undertaking within sole federal jurisdiction, to which
British Columbia responded that, with respect to interprovincial pipelines
going through the province, it had ancillary powers that worked in tandem
with the federal government over permitting and performing the environmental
assessment.128 While the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed that the
province had the power to protect its environment, it found that the purpose of
the legislation at issue was not to protect the environment per se but rather to
124. Other authors have suggested the interprovincial trade power could also be used as a basis for
nationalizing all transmission lines in the country, but that is not the position taken by this
article. See Blue, supra note 2 at 361.
125. It is perhaps worth reiterating here that there are already a few interprovincial connections
for the purpose of buying and selling electricity, and the federal government has not exerted
jurisdiction over any of them.
126. See CER Act, supra note 37, ss 11(b) (extending the regulator’s mandate to interprovincial
transmission lines), 247-52 (setting out the permitting procedure).
127. See RREMA, BCCA, supra note 8 at para 1. I have chosen to discuss this case because it
involves a clash between two provinces over an energy project, although not an electricity
one, and because of its clear articulation of federal dominance in the space.
128. Ibid at paras 2-3.
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block interprovincial pipelines carrying oil from Alberta’s oil sands.129 Te court
found that the provincial law was invalid because the power to approve or deny
such a pipeline is federal.130 Te Court denied British Columbia’s appeal.131
Te power of the federal government to regulate similar interprovincial
electricity connections seems straightforward under the same rationale, but
even in a report from the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Natural
Resources calling for more such connections, there is no suggestion that the federal
government would regulate such connections.132 Tis is not to say there are no
interprovincial transmission lines, but neither the CER nor its predecessor, the
NEB, has ever reviewed a federal permit for such a line. Provisions in the enabling
legislation of both regulators that refer to interprovincial transmission lines
seem to have been used only to approve international connections.133 However,
if an applicant wishes to obtain a permit for an international transmission line,
it has the option to choose either a federal review or a hybrid federal-provincial
review. If it chooses the latter, any conditions set by the CER are binding on the
provincial regulator.134
Under section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal
government has jurisdiction over interprovincial works.135 Tere is no single test
for determining whether federal jurisdiction has been established under 92(10)
(a), but when the issue is whether the connection of a provincial project to an
interprovincial one creates federal jurisdiction over the former, the question
may be whether there has been “functional integration” of the provincial and
interprovincial works.136 In United Transportation Union v. Central Western
Railway Corp. (“Central Western”), the issue of jurisdiction concerned a railway
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.
134.

135.
136.

Ibid at paras 93-94.
Ibid at para 101.
RREMA, SCC, supra note 8.
See House of Commons, supra note 31at 2. Te Committee did recommend to “engage
provinces and territories to identify and address regulatory barriers between jurisdictions
to facilitate developing transmission interties, increasing interprovincial and Canada-U.S.
electricity trade, and modernizing electric systems and markets” (ibid).
See CER Act, supra note 37, s. 11(b).
See generally Sincennes v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2009 ABCA 167 (in
which the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that decisions made by the NEB in a hybrid
federal-provincial approval process as to the location of a corridor in Alberta in which
the proposed transmission line to Montana could be located were binding on the Alberta
Utilities Commission).
CA, 1867, supra note 36, s 92(10)(a).
See Westcoast Energy Inc v Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 SCR 322 at 325
[Westcoast Energy].
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line located entirely within Alberta that was used to transport grain to a national
market in Vancouver.137 All of the employees of the rail line were members
of national unions.138 Te Court set out a two-part inquiry under which the
provincial rail line might fall under federal jurisdiction: It could either be part of
an existing federal work (in this case, a rail network), or it could be integral to a
federal work.139 In either case, “[s]omething more than physical connection and
a mutually benefcial commercial relationship with a federal work or undertaking
is required for a company to fall under federal jurisdiction.”140 Tese two tests for
federal jurisdiction have been used in subsequent decisions.
In Westcoast Energy v. Canada (National Energy Board) (“Westcoast Energy”),
the issue was whether gathering pipelines located entirely within one province
but connected to facilities that were part of an interprovincial (and international)
natural gas pipeline network fell under federal jurisdiction.141 Te Court
considered the issue under both tests from Central Western and found that federal
jurisdiction was established under the frst test.142 Te Court noted that common
ownership of both the gathering pipelines and the interprovincial pipelines was
not enough on its own, and neither was the physical connection between the
provincial and interprovincial lines.143 Instead, the Court made its determination
on a fnding that both the gathering lines and the larger pipeline network
were “subject to common control, direction and management by Westcoast”
as a single enterprise.144
In Tessier Ltée v. Québec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail)
(“Tessier”), the Court adopted the standard that functional integration must
be to a sufcient degree that the provincial undertaking “lose[s] its distinct
character.”145 In Tessier, the company in question had several maritime business
interests, including stevedoring or loading cargo onto ships for transport, and
argued that its involvement in navigation made its stevedoring business a federal

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

[1990] 3 SCR 1112 at 1112-13.
Ibid at 1113.
Ibid at 1113-14.
Ibid at 1114.
Supra note 136 at 322-23.
Ibid at 325.
Ibid at 325-26. See also Tokmakjian Inc v Achorn, 2017 FC 1057 (common ownership and
overlap of employees did not show functional integration of provincial and interprovincial
components); Canadian Pacifc Railway Co v British Columbia (AG), [1948] SCR 373
(fnding the same).
144. Westcoast Energy, supra note 136 at 327.
145. 2012 SCC 23 at para 55 [Tessier], citing Westcoast Energy, supra note 136 at 328.
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undertaking.146 Te Court disagreed with Tessier’s argument.147 Although
section 91(10)(a) does give the federal government jurisdiction over navigation
and shipping (in addition to other interprovincial works), that jurisdiction is
not exclusive. It specifcally covers navigation activities that have a national
character and “that engage national concerns which must be uniformly regulated
across the country, regardless of their territorial scope.”148 And, most crucially
for interprovincial transmission lines, the Court went on to state that “[u]nder
s. 92(10), the provinces are entitled to regulate transportation within their
boundaries, while the federal government has jurisdiction over transportation
that transcends provincial boundaries and connects the provinces with each
other or with other countries.”149 Tis language seems to support the idea
that provincial grids stay provincial, even when there are separately-owned
interprovincial connections.
Following the reasoning in Westcoast Energy and Tessier, the federal
government could exercise its jurisdiction to issue permits for interprovincial
transmission lines—again, this is specifcally a transmission line that begins in
one province and ends in another and is owned in its entirety by one company or
utility—without disturbing the jurisdiction that provinces have over their own
in-province transmission systems. It is possible that some of the interprovincial
transmission lines may have the same owner as one of the existing provincial
transmission infrastructures to which it is connected. But, as the abovementioned
cases show, fnding that an entire provincial transmission system is converted
to federal jurisdiction by these interprovincial lines would require more than
common ownership or physical connection; it would be necessary to show that
the existing provincial grids are part of an existing federal work or are integral to
a federal work. Tat is not the case in any province.
Moreover, not only would the existing provincial grid not be part of a federal
work, but while the federal work (the interprovincial transmission line) would rely
on the provincial transmission lines to be able to move electricity, the reverse would
not be true. And, with respect to “common control, direction, and management,”150
there would still be two independently owned, controlled, operated, and directed
provincial transmission systems on either side of the interprovincial lines running
between them. More importantly, federal jurisdiction over interprovincial works
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Ibid at paras 1-4.
Ibid at para 51.
Ibid at para 22.
Ibid at para 25.
Westcoast Energy, supra note 136 at 327.
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exists alongside the right of the provinces to regulate works entirely within their
borders. Where there is no real diference between the provincial work and a
federal system, that is one thing; but in this case, the character of the provincial
grids would not be fundamentally brought under federal operation or control
because of the addition of interprovincial connections.
B. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND THE GROWING NEED FOR NATIONAL
ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Te Court’s recent decision in GGPPA illustrates the need for federal action
in light of provincial inaction on some climate issues and the Court’s implicit
recognition of the same.151 Te law at issue was passed in 2018 as part of the Pan
Canadian Framework for Clean Growth and Climate Change (the “Framework”),
the country’s national strategy to cut GHG emissions and comply with its
obligations under the Paris Agreement.152 Prior to the Paris Agreement, Canada
had a history of failing to meet its obligations under international agreements to
fght climate change, including the Kyoto and Oslo Accords, so Canada needed
a diferent approach to succeed this time—and that approach included working
with the provinces to craft a coordinated plan to reduce GHG emissions.153
Leaders from the federal, territorial, and provincial governments formed the
Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms to study the possible role of
a carbon pricing system in meeting Canada’s emissions reductions targets, and
its work was used to create the “Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon
Pollution.”154 Tis, in turn, led to the Framework, which included the federal
backstop carbon pricing system (“the backstop”).155 Colloquially referred to as
a “carbon tax,” the backstop implemented a gap-flling carbon pricing system,
under which provinces could enact their own carbon pricing programs so long
151. GGPPA, supra note 122. An argument could be made that federal jurisdiction could be
grounded on the Peace, Order, and Good Government power’s national interest test,
as was the federal carbon pricing scheme at issue in this case. However, this article does not
make that argument because the federal government has already recognized its power to
regulate interprovincial transmission lines under the interprovincial works power; it simply
chooses not to do so. As such, interprovincial works provide both a more coherent and less
controversial basis for federal jurisdiction.
152. See Government of Canada, “Complete Text for Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth
and Climate Change Second Annual Report” (8 August 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/
en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/pan-canadian-framework-reports/
complete-text-for-second-annual-report.html> [perma.cc/92AN-Y6VD].
153. See GGPPA, supra note 122 at paras 13-15.
154. Ibid at para 16.
155. Ibid at para 17.
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as they met the minimums in the federal backstop.156 If they failed to do so by a
certain date, the backstop would take efect.157
Although the backstop was crafted in consultation with provincial leaders,
and although the Framework was adopted by eight provinces upon its release,
the constitutionality of the law was challenged by Saskatchewan, Ontario,
and Alberta.158 In its opinion, the Court began by noting the severity of the
climate crisis, stating, “[g]lobal climate change is real, and it is clear that human
activities are the primary cause.”159 Perhaps most importantly for the issue of
decarbonizing the electricity sector, the Court went on to note that the severe
impacts of unchecked climate change do not respect provincial borders:
Climate change has three unique characteristics that are worth noting. First, it has no
boundaries; the entire country and entire world are experiencing and will continue
to experience its efects. Second, the efects of climate change do not have a direct
connection to the source of GHG emissions….Yet the efects of climate change are
and will continue to be experienced across Canada, with heightened impacts in the
Canadian Arctic, coastal regions and Indigenous territories. Tird, no one province,
territory or country can address the issue of climate change on its own. Addressing
climate change requires collective national and international action. Tis is because
the harmful efects of GHGs are, by their very nature, not confned by borders.160

Tis third factor is one of the principal reasons why action on interprovincial
transmission should be taken by the federal government now, while we still have
time to stave of the worst impacts of climate change if we can achieve rapid
and dramatic reductions in GHG emissions. Across the country, we have the
renewable resources, including hydropower, wind, and solar, to achieve net-zero
power in the next few decades, but not if we continue to operate as though each
province is an island, entirely dependent on itself for resources. For decades,
the federal government has chosen to abstain from reviewing permits for
interprovincial transmission lines, but this is a policy choice, not a legal one. And
it is time for that policy to change.
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Again, this would not be a wholly new arrangement. Te CER already
issues permits for international transmission lines (there are 34 of them)161 and
does so by using the same standards set out by provincial regulators to oversee
“construction, operation and abandonment of international power lines.”162
If the CER were to expand its review to interprovincial lines, this would be the
frst essential step to quickly and efectively laying the groundwork for a robust
market for interprovincial trade in renewable power. Tis would not be a case
where the federal government is taking power away from the provinces since,
on their own, the provinces do not seem inclined to invest in transmission lines
to connect to their provincial neighbours. Tese transmission lines would also
be subject to federal law, including environmental impact assessment. Te lines
could be owned by existing transmission utilities (including Crown Corporations
like BC Hydro and SaskPower) as well as private companies entering what would
be a new market: interprovincial sale of power. Furthermore, the CER already
has experience with permitting international lines by using the regulations of the
original province, and provincial utilities thus have experience with selling power
to private companies. In other words, we already have the tools to add more
interprovincial connections to facilitate the trade of renewable power—and it is
time to use them.

VI. CONCLUSION
Te worst impacts of climate change do not respect provincial borders, and eforts
to combat those impacts by achieving rapid decarbonization in the electricity
sector should likewise not be hampered by provincial politics. Furthermore,
Canada has persistent problems with ensuring the equal access of all citizens to
reliable, safe, and afordable electricity, and is divided into have and have-not
provinces when it comes to the availability of renewable power. Te policy
change advocated by this article—that the federal government takes an active role
in expanding the availability of renewable power across its country, in particular
by permitting interprovincial transmission lines needed to spur investment
161. NRC, “Energy Facts,” supra note 63; Canada Energy Regulator, “International Power
Lines Dashboard” (last modifed 29 November 2021), online: <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/
data-analysis/facilities-we-regulate/international-power-lines-dashboard/index.html>
[perma.cc/GCW9-WNWE].
162. See Natural Resources Canada, “Canada’s Electric Reliability Framework” (15 June
2020), online: Government of Canada <www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/
energy-sources-distribution/electricity-infrastructure/electricity-canada/canada-electricreliability-framework/18792> [perma.cc/H7S2-P3WG].
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in wind, solar, and other non-hydro renewables—will not fx all of our access
problems. But it is an important step in the right direction. It is perhaps not
a surprise that the federal government has been uninterested in taking up its
role in overseeing interprovincial transmission lines, given the dominance of
the provinces in the electricity space and the sometimes-contentious politics
that erupt when provinces are told that they must allow projects within their
borders that do not yield immediate benefts to them. However, the immediacy
of the need to address carbon emissions from all sectors, including electricity,
and the continuing problems with distributional justice between urban and
rural populations (to say nothing of Indigenous populations) weighs in favour of
ending federal abdication in the electricity sector.

